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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISPROPORTIONATELY VALUING 
THE ASSETS OF THE PARTIES, BY VALUING SOME ASSETS WITHOUT 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, WHILE FAILING TO VALUE OTHERS. 
II. 
WHETHER BECAUSE OF VALUATION PROBLEMS AND THE BASIC NATURE OF 
THE ASSETS AWARDED TO THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES, THE DIVISION OF 
PROPERTY WAS INEQUITABLE. 
III. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY IN THE 
ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF REAL NEED. 
IV. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES IN 
THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF REASONABLENESS AND REAL NEED. 
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"Decree '-f ;•:-'orco" ^+ :~i - ade cer- :^ '-z^^sion and 
distr.i^ .j;..i. i . i assets by its J )ecree, which Order is here 
appealed. 
Appellant and : ..;.^ njja' w^  re i c._: ^ a ^ife, having 
married :ir. .; • L'J68f in 3ountif\], 4- r, ,-d having 
separ. * •• ->: * "."..- - di ngs of Fact ".' 
During the course oi :_..».= ^ n i a q e , the parties acquired both 
real and personal property, including the homes brought 
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into the marriage by the parties respectively. Respondent's 
home was sold after several years (TR at 8-10) and the 
proceeds of that sale were paid into a savings account 
from which the parties eventually paid off the mortgage on 
the Appellant's home in which the parties continued to live. 
(TR at 10, 53). 
Personalty acquired during the marriage included 
motorcycles (TR at 19), automobiles (TR at 18), furnishings 
for the home, and a large recreational boat. (TR at 20, 53)• 
The values set for these items and the accounts held by the 
respective parties are listed in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision (See Addendum). 
The parties are both employed and have base salaries. 
Appellant's is $1540.00 gross every two weeks, while the 
Respondent's is $992.00 gross per month. (TR at 105-106). 
The home awarded to Respondent is fully paid for and 
rent-free. Appellant had lived in that home from December 
of 1961 until the marriage in June of 1968. (TR at 87). 
Thereafter the parties lived in Appellant's home but kept 
and continued to make payments upon Respondent's home until 
it was sold in late 1973 or early 1974. (TR at 89, 115). 
Appellant did not initially request the divorce, and denies 
Respondent's allegations of threats and cruelty. (TR at 83-84). 
Respondent's 22 year-old son had been living with the parties 
and was a source of irritation to Appellant. Respondent sided 
with her son, and ultimately had appellant removed from the 
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failed to fix a value upon an expensive collection of fine 
china which the Appellant testified his wife had represented 
to be worth a substantial sum. (TR at 21, 99). 
The result of the Court's division of assets is that 
the Respondent continues to reside, rent-free in the paid 
for marital home, and enjoys a relatively uninterrupted 
lifestyle and security. She is surround€>d by the furnishings 
of the home, which were awarded primarily to her, and has 
in addition to her wage income $250.00 per month in alimony 
from the Appellant. Appellant, on the other hand, is forced 
into a lifestyle dramatically removed from his former 
estate. His living costs have doubled as a result of his 
being put out of the home. His familiar belongings are 
in Respondent's possession or have been given away, and his 
assets depleted by attorney fees and mounting costs. Assets 
awarded to him as profit-sharing programs and retirement 
do not produce any income for the next five years, during 
which time he must pay alimony to maintain his wife's life-
style, and this in spite of there being no threat she will 
become a public charge nor has need. When his retirement 
programs begin producing income, it will be meager in 
comparison to his present capacity, and will be fully taxed, 
while her assets are not unavailable to Respondent, and 
have only a modest property tax on the home. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISPROPORTIONATELY VALUING THE 
ASSETS OF THE PARTIES, BY VALUING SOME ASSETS WITHOUT 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, WHILE FAILING TO VALUE OTHERS. 
A. Value was improperly set for the Appellant's 
properties and assets: 
1. The Retirement fund was not susceptable to 
valuation, as admitted by the court. 
2. The more reliable evidence on the boat's value 
and the preponderence of evidence on its value came from 
the Appellant, and showed a substantially lower value 
than allowed by the court. 
3. There is no "ESOP" stock for which the court 
found a value, and no evidence of such in the record. 
4. No testimony on the record establishes the "value" 
of the penney stocks as fixed by the court, and the only 
evidence of value is speculative at best. 
5. Values on "furnishings" in the home divided 
between the parties are not founded upon the testimony 
of either party, and are therefore speculative. 
B. No value was assigned for Appellant's equity and 
investments in the parties1 homes; nor was value assigned 
for the Respondent's fine china collection or expensive 
clothing. No rebuttal is found in the record to the evidence 
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presented as to the value of this collection. 
C. Awarding equal equity in the marital home was error. 
1. Appellant had established an invested value 
in the marital home prior to the marriage. 
2. Appellant had equity in the Respondent's home 
established after the marriage but before the sale of 
Respondentf s home. 
3. The court failed to find facts on the above 
issues, and instead generalized its conclusions and 
awarded the home to the Respondent after finding equal 
equity in it. 
II. 
BECAUSE OF VALUATION PROBLEMS AND THE BASIC NATURE OF THE 
ASSETS AWARDED TO THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES, THE DIVISION OF 
PROPERTY WAS INEQUITABLE. 
A. Equitable treatment is required as a matter of 
sound policy and practice. 
1. It is generally accepted that the relief 
granted in a divorce action is equitable in nature. 
2. The policy of our law and equity is to provide 
"a just and equitable adjustment of economic resources 
so that the parties might reconstruct their lives on a 
happy and useful basis." (Citation omitted). 
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3. In fashioning equitable property divisions in 
a divorce proceeding, the court may take into consider-
ation-all pertinent circumstances, encompassing all 
assets of every nature possessed by the parties. The 
essential criterion is whether a right to the benefit 
or asset has accrued, and to that degree it is subject 
to equitable distribution. (Citation omitted). However, 
any division which does not place the parties in an 
equitable relationship such that they may reconstruct 
their lives on a more or less equal footing defeats 
fairness. The plan which upholds one party's lifestyle 
while burdening and defeating the other's is inequitable 
per se. 
(a) Our laws in modern times speak to the necessity 
of treating the sexes equally. 
(b) Equal treatment must mean balancing all aspects 
of the division of assets, including some reasonable 
estimation of the impact a particular division will 
be likely to have on the lifestyles and means of 
both parties. A mere split on an estimated dollar 
balance fixed by the court without sufficient evidence 
on the record will tend to create unequal results, 
and is more likely to produce inequitable residual 
effects. 
(c) In the present case the court was concerned with 
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merely dividing equally the dollar amounts involved, 
and did not address the question of whether such 
division would work an inequitable result. 
4. Because the court failed to properly weigh the 
impact of its decision upon the parties, the result 
was disparate in effect. 
(a) The Respondent is given a protected lifestyle 
with little or no readjustment necessary. She lives 
without much change. 
(b) The Appellant is dramatically impacted in his 
lifestyle. Forced from the home he had occupied 
years longer than the Respondent, he is left with 
few furnishings of his own, dramatically increased 
expenses, including continued forced contribution 
to his former spouse. 
(c) Appellant has a seriously limited estate, since 
his retirement benefits do not come to him for 
five years at least, and those benefits will not 
survive the contingency of his death. His profit 
shares are beyond his reach until retirement, at 
which time they will be subject to full taxation. 
(d) Respondent by contrast has immediate economic 
benefit from the house she received, wholey paid 
for and rent free. Her assets are unlikely to 
reduce in value and are not so heavily burdened with 
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tax consequences* In the event of her death, her 
received assets are fully inheritable by her heirs, 
who are not Appellant's. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY IN THE ABSENCE OF 
A SHOWING OF REAL NEED. 
A. The testimony and evidence at trial did not demonstrate 
any actual or real need for alimony from the Appellant. 
B. The award of alimony further exacerbates Appellant's 
economic condition, and takes in the five years contemplated 
some eleven thousand-plus dollars ($11,000.00) from the 
Appellant to preserve Respondent's lifestyle while his own 
is irretrievably and inequitably diminished. There is no 
justification for this. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES IN THE ABSENCE 
OF A SHOWING OF REASONABLENESS AND REAL NEED. 
A. The testimony at trial failed to establish the 
reasonableness of the fees charged by Respondent's attorney. 
B. The testimony and evidence at trial failed to demonstrate 
need on the part of the Respondent. Her debts were few and 
small. Her ongoing need for home improvements was undefined, 
and her salary adequate to meet her reasonable needs, including fees, 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISPROPORTIONATELY VALUING THE ASSETS 
OF THE PARTIES, BY VALUING SOME ASSETS WITHOUT SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE, WHILE FAILING TO VALUE OTHERS. 
The Retirement Fund 
Appellant had a retirement program at his place of work. 
The Court below heard testimony from Ronald N. Roy at trialf 
to the effect that he would place a value upon the fund 
based upon what it would take to have an insurance company 
produce $265.13 of present monthly income on a twenty-year 
mortality basis. (TR at 75-76). He admitted that this was 
not the sum available to Appellant, but only what an insurer 
would need at the present to produce the benefits above. 
(TR at 77). The Court in its Memorandum Decision at paragraph 
19 found that the retirement had vested, but that actual 
value would depend upon the number of years the Appellant 
would live following retirement. Since this was difficult 
to determine as a contingency, the Court placed an arbitrary 
value of $15,000.00 upon the fund, and awarded it to the 
Appellant. (Memorandum Decision at Paragraph 19). 
In examining the Witness Roy, Respondents attorney 
made reference to a certain exhibit P-16, a booklet explaining 
the retirement rights. (TR at 79). The exhibit was received, 
and is part of the record here. At page 8 of the exhibit P-16 
these words are found: "If you are not married or have been 
married less than six months, you would be entitled to a 
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straight life benefit for your lifetime only." At page 
15 of exhibit P-16 these words are found: "What if I should 
die- . .". and the answer is given: "If you receive a 
lifetime only benefit, no further payments would be made 
after your death." Thus the Court below has fixed a value upon 
an asset that is based upon the speculation that the 
Appellant will live to collect itf and has awarded to the 
Appellant an asset that cannot be inherited or of benefit 
to his heirs. 
The Boat 
The parties owned a 26 foot 1978 Fiberform boat with 
twin outboard engines. (TR at 123). Respondent's only 
testimony regarding the value of this item was to the effect 
that she had heard Appellant say on one occasion at an undesig-
nated point in time, that an undesignated person would pay 
twenty-thousand dollars for the boat, which was the original 
pruchase price. (TR at 21). That was represented by 
Respondent to be the price on the boat as a "trade-in." (Id.) 
Appellant offered exhibits D-16 and 17 and testimony 
as to the conversations he had had with boat dealers. Their 
offers on the boat were in the $10,000.00 to $12,000.00 
range (presumably wholesale also). (TR at 93). The exhibits 
were admitted over Respondent's objections. (Id.) 
The most reliable evidence on the record thus fixed the 
value of the boat at considerably less than the $16,600.00 
pulled out of the air by the trial Judge. 
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"ESOP STOCK" 
The Court created stock where there is none. At paragraph 
17 of the Memorandum Decision, Judge Page awarded to the 
Appellant "the ESOP stock" and valued it at $690.00, No 
such stock exists on the record, except for an unexplained 
and cryptic reference in one of the Respondent's exhibits 
to something called "ESOP." (Exhibit P-8 or 9, Trial 
Exhibits. The page does not appear to be labeled but is 
attached to the other exhibits /~P-9, See TR at 42_7 )• 
The awarding of a non-existent asset on the basis of 
an unexDlained exhibit entry admitted only as illustrative 
of the witness Respondent's testimony (TR at 43) is 
itself illustrative of the Trial Court Judge's predilection 
to simply add up assets and assign values to provide a 
numerical format for splitting the blanket, without considering 
the equitable impact or the evidence quantum. 
Penney Stocks 
The value of the Penney stocks was never established 
by the laying of proper foundation or admission of evidence. 
The only evidence presented was the Respondent's (Plaintiff's) 
Exhibit 6 which lists without reference values for these 
stocks. (TR at 25 shows testimony of the Respondent to 
the effect that these figures represent "the current quotes 
as of Friday," but gave no reference point for that comment.). 
The exhibit was admitted as illustrative of testimony only. 
(TR at 26) . 
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Home Furnishings 
Respondent testified that the value of the home furnishings 
was that Bet forth on Exhibit P-5. (TR at 16), Exhibit P-9 
also apparently sets forth the value Respondent placed upon 
the furnishings, as $3575.00. (Addendum, P-9). 
Appellant valued the furnishings at $5,000.00. (TR at 
108, See also Exhibits D-6 & 7). 
The Trail Court fixed the value of furnishings at $3500.00. 
{Memorandum Decision at paragraph 6.) No appraisal was offered 
of the assets, and no analysis offered of the estimated costs 
or value on the furnishings. Hence, no basis existed for 
the Court to fix the value of the furnishings as it did, there 
being an equal weight of evidence as to the value. 
The Homes 
Appellant had equity in both his home and the Respondent's 
home as a marital asset prior to its sale in 1974. (TR at 8-10, 
53, 114-15). However, the Court failed to fix any value for 
Appellant's contributions toward the Respondent's home, and 
also ignored the improvements Appellant had put into the 
Appellant's home prior to the marriage. (TR at 114-15). No 
appreciated value was assigned to Appellant's home for the 
six to seven years he had occupied it prior to the marriage, 
although some $2000.00 in value was admitted to by Respondent's 
counsel in his questioning, (TR at 115). The Court below, 
in essence, simply balanced the contribution of the Respondent 
against the contributions of the Appellant without any effort 
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to s cifically address these equitable issues or find facts 
from he record before it. The record does not support the 
Cour conclusion. 
jfefc China Collection 
Agx&llant testified as to the admissions of the Respondent 
regarding value of her fine china figurines. This is essentially 
the sane sort of testimony, apparently, that the Court 
relied upon in finding a value for the boat. However, in the 
case of the China, the Court was not disposed to find any 
value in the items, and remained silent on the subject. Valuing 
this item would have made a substantial impact upon the division 
of assets. (TR at 122-23). If the Court can find a value 
for the boat based upon the hazy admissions claimed by the 
RespoRifent, and in spite of the detailed denial and evidence 
offered on that point by the Appellant, why could it not 
find a value for the China Collection, especially in the 
absence of rebuttal testimony or evidence on the subject? 
II. 
BECAUSE OF THE VALUATION PROBLEMS AND THE BASIC NATURE OF 
THE ASSETS AWARDED TO THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES, THE DIVISION 
OF PROPERTY WAS INEQUITABLE, 
A. Equity means balancing the awards to prevent placing 
the parties in unecessarily burdened lifestyles or positions. 
It is generally accepted that the relief granted in a 
divorce action is equitable in nature. The policy of our 
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system is to provide "a just and equitable adjustment of 
economic resources so that the parties might reconstruct 
their lives on a happy and useful basis,11 Searle v. Searle, 
522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974); Barrett v. Barrett, 403 P.2d 
649, 17 Utah 2d 1 (1965). See also Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 
871, 872-73 (Utah 1979) 
In fashioning equitable property divisions in a divorce 
proceeding, the Court may take into consideration all 
pertinent circumstances, encompassing all assets of every 
nature possessed by the parties. The essential criterion is 
whether a right to the benefit or asset has accrued, and to 
that degree it is subject to equitable distribution. 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) (setting inter 
alia a standard for division of assets which are difficult 
to assign a present value to, e.g. retirement funds). 
However, any division which does not place the parties 
in an equitable relationship such that they may reconstruct 
their lives on a more or less equal footing defeats fairness. 
The plan which upholds one partu's lifestyle while burdening 
and defeating the other's is inequitable per se. 
B. To achieve equity, all aspects of the impact of a 
division should be examined. 
Equality of treatment is to a large degree the basis 
of equity, tempered by the requirements of justice. In the 
tradition of our case law, the standard has been to balance 
all aspects of a case, and not merely split on a percentage 
the dollar totals. 
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Our laws in modern times speak to the equality before 
the law of the sexes. (See for example: Utah Code Annotated, 
sections 11-25-12 (residential financing to be unbiased); 
34-35-6 (Antidiscrimination Act); 13-7-1 (Civil Rights Act).). 
This has manifested itself in courts of equity as a 
general principle that all aspects of the case be balanced 
and considered to avoid disparate results. Where the lower 
courts have made unequal but equitable divisions of 
property they have been upheld on the principle that balance 
of equities sometimes requires such results. Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) (Award of 77% of assets 
to wife based upon her greater productivity during the 
marriage); Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982) 
(a 40-60% split upheld where no alimony was awarded and other 
factor impacted the result). 
However, when the courts fail to make a full consideration 
of the results to be achieved, and are concerned, as is 
evident in the present case, with merely dividing equally 
as opposed to equitably the dollar amounts involved, the 
result is a burden on one lifestyle and a blessing on the 
other; an inequitable achievement. 
It can be noted that the Respondent is given here a 
protected lifestyle with little or no readjustment necessary. 
She lives without much change in "her,! home, surrounded by 
"her" furnishings and expensive china, driving a nice car, 
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and receiving income from both her job, which appears secure, 
and her savings, and the Appellant. He on the other hand is 
dramatically impacted in his lifestyle. Forced from the 
home he had occupied years longer than the Respondent, he 
is left with little in the way of possessions and furnishings, 
dramatically increased costs for housing and expenses, 
including forced continued support of his former spouse 
and indirectly through her of the twenty-three year old 
step-son who was making no contribution to the home but 
living there. (TR at 49). 
Appellant has a seriously limited estate, since his re-
tirement benefits do not come to him for five years and 
will not survive the contingency of his death. His profit 
shares are beyond his reach until retirement (TR at 126). 
At retirement the shares and retirement are subject to full 
taxation. 
Respondent by contrast has immediate access to her 
liquid assets, and the items given to her are unlikely 
to lessen in value over time. Except for the house tax, 
her assets are not subject to the level of tax the Appellant 
will pay on the future income as ordinary income. In the 
event of Respondent's death, her estate will pass to and 
benefit her heirs, which are not Appellant's. His estate 
will be lost at death as to his retirement benefits. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY IN THE ABSENCE 
OF A SHOWING OF REAL NEED. 
A. The testimony and evidence at trial did not demonstrate 
any actual need for alimony from the Appellant. Respondent 
showed the court her expenses, including $100.00 per month 
for clothes, and $125.00 per month for incidentals. In spite 
of Respondent's limited driving needs , she expends $230.00 
per month on her automobile, and another $125.00 a month on 
entertainments. Her utilities must be among the highest in 
town, at $200.00 per month year around, and she lavishes 
$100.00 per month or .ome repairs. (See Exhibit P-8, Addendum). 
Even given a short-term need to do some repairs to fix 
a leak and a bathroom basin, she should live in style at 
these rates. 
Respondent's income is between $992.00 and $1100.00 gross 
per month, depending upon whose testimony we accept. Her 
home is paid for and rent-free. She has a son living at home 
and he has steady income from a job. (TR at 49). 
The award of alimony further exacerbates Appellant's 
damaged economics, and takes in the five years contemplated 
some eleven thousand dollars ($11,400.00) from the Appellant 
to preserve Respondent's lifestyle while his own is diminished 
dramatically. There is no justification for this. 
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IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES IN THE ABSENCE 
OF A SHOWING OF REASONABLENESS AND REAL NEED. 
A. Testimony at trial failed to address the reasonable-
ness of the fees charged by Respondent's attorney. 
"In divorce cases, awards of attorney's fees must be 
supported by evidence which shows that the requested 
award is reasonable." Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862, 863 (Utah 
1984) (Citing Delatore v. Delatore, Utah, 680 P.2d 27 (1984), 
and Kerr v. Kerr, Utah, 610 P.2d 1380 (1980).). Relevant 
factors include the necessity of the number of hours claimed, 
reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty 
of the case and the result, and rates commonly charged in 
the community. Id.. , Kerr v. Kerr, at 1384-85. 
In the present case Respondent's attorney merely intro-
duced an exhibit listing the hours spent and nature of the 
activities filling those hours. It should be noted there is 
never a phone call for less than .3 hours (18 minutes in 
length) and that there was no proferred testimony addressing 
reasonableness of the time spent or of the rates charged 
in the community. No testimony was offered regarding the 
difficulty of the case or justifying the amounts sought. 
(TR at 80-81). 
B. The evidence at trial failed to demonstrate need 
on the Respondent's part for attorney fees. The Court awarded 
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a mutual divorce, without greater or lesser blame. The 
information previously offered in argument III. A. 
shows that the Respondent was able to meet her own needs, 
and this is particularly true if this tribunal upholds the 
alimony awarded. Respondent had no meaningful debts, and 
is gainfully employed. She is capable of supporting herself, 
having held responsible positions. (TR at 151) (Respondent 
had worked for an airline, was considered an authority on 
tax structures, and was in charge of a number of other 
employees). 
Were Respondent to appear before any court in this state 
in need of counsel, what are the odds that a judge would 
recognize her as having a need for counsel she could not 
meet on her own with her resources? 
CONCLUSIONS 
By failing to value Appellant's interest in the home 
sold by Respondent, and by failing to recognize any value 
in the improvements and appreciation Appellant made to the 
marital home prior to marriage, the trial court committed 
discretionary error. This error was compounded when because 
of it the Court overvalued Respondent's contribution to 
the marital home at payoff of the mortgage. 
The trial court further erred when it failed to value 
Respondent's China Collection, and undervalued the home 
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furnishings awarded the parties. The evidence presented to 
the Court below did not provide meaningful appraisals 
or testimony as to value other than the unsupported opinions 
of the Respondent and in some cases Appellant. Where support 
was provided on the value of the boat, the trial judge 
chose to ignore that support in favor of the unsupported 
testimony of the Respondent, and made a value without basis 
in fact or the marketplace. 
The trial court also erred in finding a non-existent 
stock and valuing it as "ESOP Stock." This resulted in 
an inequitable distribution of value to the Respondent and 
nothing to the Appellant to that extent. 
Appellant's retirement fund was difficult to define 
as a present asset, and the court fixed a value based 
more on guesswork and hope than any fact before it. A standard 
exists in our courts for fixing value on such accounts, as 
set forth in Woodward v. Woodward, Supra. By treating this 
asset as if it were a present asset rather than a future 
possibility contingent upon work continuing and life remaining, 
the trial court created a disparate result; for Respondent 
ended up with assets having current value and use to 
maintain her lifestyle, while Appellant is cast out to 
await the possibility of future earnings with the tax man 
at his elbow. 
Finally, absent a meaningful showing of need from the 
Respondent, and in the case of attorney fees, of reasonableness 
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on the record, no alimony or attorney fees should have 
been awarded. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant prays the Supreme Court Reverse and Remand as 
follows: 
1. Remand on the issue of the home value allocation, 
requiring the Court below to assign value to the Appellant's 
interest in the Respondent's home sold, and in the marital 
home as appreciation and improvements. 
2. Remand to determine the value based on appraisal of 
the China Collection, Boat, and Furnishings, and reallocate 
the property division accordingly. 
3. Reverse as to the "ESOP Stock." 
4. Reverse as to the retirement fund value and remand 
to set a value as of the time of realization or a percentage 
assessment as set forth in Woodward v. Woodward, Supra. 
5. Reverse as to Alimony and attorney fees. 
Dated this 14th day of March, 1985. 
<db&bJ^j L 
it 
Bean & Smedley 
Stephen A, Van Dyke, Esq, 
Attorney for Appellant 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct set of 
copies of the above Appellant's Brief this 14th day of March, 
1985 to Respondents Counsel at 48 Post Office Place, Third 
Floor, New York Bldg,, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage 
prepaid, all as required bv law and the Appellate Rules of 
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ADDENDUM 
Plaintiff/Respondent1s Exhibits at Trial . . .#5, 6, 7, 9, 18 
Defendant/Appellant's Exhibits at Trial . . .#1, 2, 3, 4, 16, 17 
A portion of Exhibit P-16, Benefits Booklet 
Memorandum Decision of 4 September, 1984 
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law 
Divorce Decree of 14 November, 1984 
NOTE: Defendant/Appellant1s Exhibit D-3 at trial is here 
denoted "Exhibit C" without change. 
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Furniture and Furnishings Purchased During Marriage 
Color television - W 
Living-room couch - W 
Recliner chair - W 
Living-room clock - W 
Sewing Machine - W 
Small curio cabinet - W 
Gun cabinet - W 
Globe - W 
Bedroom hutch - W 
Hide-a-way couch - W 
Curio cabinet in living room - W 
Kitchen hutch - W 
Coffee table (basement) - W 
Coffee table - W 
End table - W 
Small rocking chair - H 
Remote control color television - W 
Binoculars - H 
Polaroid camera - W 
Miscellaneous guns - H 
Golf clubs - H 
Microwave oven - W 
Two-way radio - H 
Yard Equipment - W __^ 
I PLAINTIFF'S 
I EXHIBIT I 
STOCK 
Name 
Tintic Mining 
Classic Mining 
Modern Minerals 
Midnight Gold & Silver 
Gyro 
Stansbury 
Airlift International 
Totals 
Shares 
10,000 
3,000 
1,000 
2,000 
50 
5,000 
40 
Price per 
Share 
0.07 
0.10 
0.10 
0.125 
.15 
.02 
.10 
$ 
$1 
Value 
700.00 
300.00 
100.00 
25.00 
7.50 
100.00 
4.00 
,236.50 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
3HZ19 
Creditor 
Sears 
Allman's Carpets 
Total 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
Plaintiff's Obligations 
Balance 
$ 66.00 
66.00 
$ 132.00 
Monthly 
Payment 
$ 20 .00 
25 .00 
$ 45 .00 
Plaintiff's Current Monthly Living Expenses 
Real Property Taxes (residence) 
Real Property Insurance 
Maintenance (residence) 
(residence) 
Food & Household Supplies 
Utilities 
Telephone 
Laundry & Dry Cleaning 
Clothing 
Medical 
Entertainment 
Incidentals 
Auto Expense 
Installment Payments 
Total 
$ 
$1 
45.00 
20.00 
100.00 
250.00 
200.00 
25.00 
30.00 
100.00 
25.00 
125.00 
125.00 
230.00 
45.00 
,320.00 
Assets of the Parties 
Home ($64,500 appraisal) 
$2,500.00 equity to H 
$6,600.00 reimbursed to W $55,400.00 
1980 Thunderbird 2,500.00 
1982 Ford Pickup and Camper Shell 7,000.00 
1971 Honda 90 Motorcycle 250.00 
1975 Honda XL Motorcycle 400.00 
Furniture & Furnishings 3,575.00 
Utah Bank & Trust (checking) - H 6,395.06* 
Utah Bank & Trust (savings) - J 20,445.84** 
Tracy Collins (checking) - W 250.00 
Boat - J 20,000.00 
Stocks 1,236.50 
IRA - First Interstate - W 9,250.02 
IRA - United Bank - H (3 accounts) 7,114.58 
Silver - 500 oz. ($6.00/oz.) 3,000.00 
ESOP - H 
31.422 shares ($22.00/share) 691.28 
Portland Cement Profit Sharing - H 
(as of July 31, 1984) 27,426.86 
Merrill Lynch Share Builder 
442.0598 shares 8,730.68 
TOTAL $173,665.82 
$173,665.82 ; 2 = $86,832.91 
Pension and Retirement - W ? 
Grand Total $ 
* As of December 7, 1983 
** As of September 30, 1983 - Husband withdrew $6,000.00 on 
Decmeber 21, 1983. 
Division of Assets 
Wife 
Home 
1980 Thunderbird 
1971 Honda 90 
Furniture & 
Furnishings 
Tracy Collins 
(checking) 
IRA - First Inter-
state 
Sub-total 
Cash 
TOTAL 
$ 55,400.00 
2,500.00 
250.00 
3,075.00 
250.00 
9,250.02 
$" 70,725.07 
+ 16,107.89 
$ 86,832.91 
Husband 
1982 Ford pickup 
1975 Honda XL 
Utah Bank & Trust 
(checking) 
Utah Bank & Trust 
(savings) 
Boat 
Stocks 
IRA 
Silver 
Furniture & Furn-
ishings 
ESOP 
$ 7,000.00 
400.00 
6,395.06 
20,445.84 
20,000.00 
1,236.50 
7,114.58 
3,000.00 
500.00 
691.28 
Portland Cement profit-
sharing account 27,426.86 
8,730.68 
$102,940.bu 
- 16,107.89 
86,832.91 
Merrill Lynch 
Share Builder 
Sub-total 
TOTAL 
A~A <;S00 00 per month in alimony. 
Plaintiff to be awarded $500.00 p 
*-n Plaintiff the sum of $2,500.UU 
Defendant to be ordered to pay to Plaintiff 
in attorney's fees. 
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MATTER 
v. Talley 
Date Atty Description 
84/06/06 AR .3 Letter to client 
84/06/12 AR .3 Phone conversation w/client (boat) 
84/06/14 AR .5 Phone conversation w/client (appraisal); letter to 
Lifferth; phone conversation w/Smedley (boat, home) 
84/06/15 AR .7 Meeting w/client; letter to Smedley 
84/06/20 Payment 
84/06/25 AR 2.5 Prepare for pre-trial; pre-trial hearing; trip to and 
from Fatmington 
84/06/26 AR .6 Memo to file; letters to Smedley & client 
84/06/26 AR .3 Phone conversation w/client (prepare lists) 
84/06/26 Arnold Richer/Mileage to Farmington 
Costs Payments 
210.00 
8.00 
TOTAL ATTY HRS 
TOTAL COSTS 
TOTAL PAYMENTS 
5.2 
8.00 
210.00 
******************** 
X A X l L l b l / UUlXiMit 
MATTER 
v. Talley 
Date 
84/05/02 
84/05/07 
84/05/08 
84/05/09 
84/05/11 
84/05/16 
84/05/18 
84/05/22 
84/05/29 
Atty Description 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
Photocopies (14) 
1.2 Meeting w/client - Financial Declaration; review 
1.8 Review file; drafting Financial Declaration 
.3 Phone call to Judge Cornaby's Clerk; phone conversation 
w/client (Herbal Life); phone conversation w/Smedley 
.4 Revise Financial Declaration 
.4 Meeting w/client - signing of Financial Declaration 
.3 Phone conversations w/client (2); phone conversation 
w/Mt. Bell (phone bill) 
.5 Phone conference with Smedley; letter to client; letter 
to Lifferth 
Payment 
Co 
2 
TOTAL ATTY HRS 
TOTAL COSTS 
TOTAL PAYMENTS 
4.9 
2.80 
400.00 
******************** 
A X V A J J J . U A
 9 UUIMFMI 
MATTER 
v. Talley 
Date 
84/04/03 
84/04/04 
84/04/09 
84/04/10 
84/04/19 
84/04/24 
84/04/30 
Atty Description 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
TOTAL ATTY HRS 
TOTAL COSTS 
.3 Phone conversation w/Smedley 
.3 Note to file 
.3 Transmittal letter 
Photocopies (7) 
.4 Review Answers to Interrogatories, 
letter to client 
Photocopies (45) 
.3 Letter to client 
1.6 
10.40 
etc* from Smedley; 
Costs Payments 
1.40 
9.00 
******************** 
MATTER 
v. Talley 
Date 
84/03/05 
84/03/07 
84/03/09 
84/03/09 
84/03/14 
84/03/15 
84/03/15 
84/03/19 
Atty Description Co 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
.3 Letter to client 
.3 Phone conversation w/client (H's records/bank accounts) 
.7 Meeting w/client (answers to Interrogatories) 
.5 Draft answers to Interrogatories 
.4 Phone conversation w/client; revise Answers to Interrogs 
.5 Phone conversation w/client; revise Answers to Interroga-
tories; letter to Smedley 
Photocopies (50) 
.3 Meeting w/client - sign Answers to Interrogatories 
10 
TOTAL ATTY HRS 
TOTAL COSTS 
3.0 
10.00 
******************** 
MATTER 
v. Talley 
Date Atty Description Costs Payments 
84/02/13 AR ,3 Phone conversation w/Smedley & w/client 
84/02/16 AR ,3 Phone conversation w/Smedley & w/client 
TOTAL ATTY HRS 0.6 
******************** 
MATTER 
v. Talley 
Date 
84/01/04 
84/01/04 
84/01/09 
84/01/09 
84/01/24 
Atty Description 
AR 
AR 
AR 
1.0 Letter 
Photocopies 
.3 Review 
Photocopies 
to client; 
(ID 
documents; 
(60) 
draft Reply/interrogatories/Requests 
photocopying 
Costs 
2.20 
12.00 
Payments 
TOTAL ATTY HR$ 
TOTAL COSTS 
3 Meeting w/client (bank transfer, etc) 
1.6 
14.20 
******************** 
MATTER 
v. Talley 
Date 
83/12/07 
83/12/08 
83/12/09 
83/12/13 
83/12/14 
83/12/14 
83/12/14 
83/12/14 
83/12/15 
83/12/15 
83/12/15 
83/12/15 
83/12/16 
83/12/19 
83/12/19 
83/12/20 
83/12/20 
83/12/22 
83/12/22 
83/12/23 
83/12/27 
83/12/27 
83/12/30 
Atty Description 
AR 1.4 Initial consultation 
Payment 
AR 1.2 Draft Summons/Complaint/TRO/Motion/Affidavit 
AR .4 Review £ revise documents 
Davis County Clerk/Filing Fee/Complaint/OTSC 
Richard Dibblee/Mileage to Farmington 
RD 2.5 File Complaint & TRO in Davis County 
Photocopies (60) 
AR .3 Phone to Sindt (special run); organize documents 
Davis County Clerk/Copies 
Richard Dibblee/Mileage to Farmington 
RD 1.0 Obtain 5 certified copies of TRO in Davis County 
AR .3 Meeting w/client (intro to PHL & SAD) 
SD .3 Telephone conversation w/Donna re service of TRO 
John Sindt/Service & Special Run/Summons, Complaint & OTSC 
AR .5 Phone w/client & Smedley (TRO); discuss w/SD; note 
AR .3 Phone conversation w/client (carpet/call H's daughter) 
FP .3 * Filing
 % 
SD .3 Telephone call to Stan Smedley 
SD .6 Telephone conversation w/client; review file 
SD 4.0 Review file; prepare for OTSC; appear at OTSC 
Sharon Donovan/Mileage to Farmington 
SD .8 Dictate Order; letter to Stan Smedley 
Costs 
57.00 
6 .00 
12 .00 
10.00 
6.00 
39.00 
6.00 
TOTAL ATTY HRS 
TOTAL CLK HRS 
TOTAL COSTS 
TOTAL PAYMENTS 
10.4 
3.8 
136.00 
1,000.00 
******************** 
EXHIBIT A 
RESIDENCE ANALYSIS 
Date of Purchase: 
Purchase Price: 
Capital Improvements: 
Dec. 1961 by Glenn Talley, sole 
$17,375.00 
3,160.00 
Parties Marriage: 
Current Appraised Values 
June 1968 - 7 1/2 yrs after 
purchase 
$64,500.00 
$64,500.00 
20,535.00 
$43,965.00 
Current Value 
Basis of cost of Defendant 
Increased Value 1961 - 1984 
22 Years @ $1,998.41 year 
Defendant's Equity in Home as of Parties Marriage 
$20,535.00 Cost basis 
14,988.00 7 1/2 @ $1,998.41 yr. 
Dec. 1961 - June 1968 
$35,523.00 Value as of Parties Marriage 
Division of Equity between Parties 
$64,500.00 
35,523.00 
$29,000.00 
Appraised Value 
Value as of Parties Marriage 
Marital Equity divided by 2 = $14,500.00 each 
Plaintiff's Entitlement 
$14,500.00 
4,950.00 Plaintiff's Equity from 
$19,450.00 sale of Personal Residence 
Defendant's Entitlement 
$35,500.00 
14,500.00 
$50,000.00 
-4,950.00 Plaintiff's 
$45,050.00 contribution 
from sale of 
residence 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT B 
ASSETS 
Item Purchased 
Home - December 1961 
H H G & F 
Utah Bank & Trust Checking 
Defendant's Personal Checking 
Utah Bank & Trust Saving 
1980 Thunderbird Auto 
1982 Ford PU 
1971 Honda 90 Cycle 
1975 Honda 250 Cycle 
Lone Star Stock 
Lone Star Retirement 
Profit Sharing 
Classic Mining Stock 
Tintic Mining Stock 
IRA Account Plaintiff 
IRA Account Defendant 
Boat 
Silver 
Tax Reserve 
Belleck China Collection 
Meat - Frozen Food Storage 
Plaintiff's Jewelry and Clothing 
Value 
$64,500 
6,000* 
2,000* 
100* 
15,000* 
4,675* 
7,137* 
250* 
400* 
8,730* 
27,000 
000 
600* 
9,250* 
7,114* 
11,500* 
3,700* 
2,000* 
2,500* 
1,000* 
5,000* 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT C 
ANALYSIS OF MARITAL ASSETS TO PLAINTIFF 
Assets of Exhibit B $87,000 
Divide 50/50 $43,500 
Plaintiff's Marital Equity in Home (Exhibit ) 19,500 
TOTAL $63,000 
Deduct: 
Boat damage 500 
BALANCE $62,500 
Defendant's Assets at Time of Marriage 
A) Savings $ 1,632 
B) 1965 Mercury Automobile 1,800 
EXHIBIT D 
INCOME 
Defendant 
Lone Star Industries 
Base Pay - 1st and 15th $1,540 
Gross Pay $1,733 
Net Pay 8/15/84 $1,009 
Base Pay per Month $3,080 
Net Pay per Month $2,018 
Plaintiff 
Forester Concrete 
Base Pay - Every two weeks $ 553 
Net Pay $ 440 
Base Pay per Month $1,198 
Net Pay per Month $ 953 
Defendant's exhibit 4 
At trial 
"MARINE SPECIALISTS" 
PHONE (801) 534-1111 
1045 SOUTH MAIN SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
S&&& 
By St. Ray Ouul.nd.nfl 0u.my 
7
 m Fibtrfli.** &o»U 
^ 0 1 ^ MARINE 
3638 South State 
FRANK KERR Salt Lake City Utah 84115 
(801)266-9911 
/ 7 ^ U;d-/3-f<J>efi*r*< 
fytUt/r iW*^—-
When may I rotire?_ 
Normal Retirement 
Your normal retirement age is 65. You may retire and begin receiving benefits if you are 65 years old and 
have 5 or more years of Eligibility Service. 
Early Retirement 
If you want to retire before age 65 and you are between 55 and 65 years old with at least 10 years of 
Continuous Service, you may do so by filing the necessary application forms. 
Late Retirement 
If you do reach your normal retirement date, and if requested by the Company and it is agreeable to you, 
you may continue to work for a period of one year or less. At the end of this period, additional periods 
may be extended with the approval of the Company. 
Disability Retirement 
Regardless of your age, if you become totally and permanently disabled after at least one year of con-
tinuous service; if you qualify for a Social Security disability benefit and if you remain disabled for six 
consecutive months, you may apply for disability retirement. 
How much 
will my pension he n I retire at ape 85? 
Your pension payments are determined by a formula that multiplies a percentage of your Final Average 
Salary by your Credited Service and then subtracts a portion — never to exceed 50% — of your Primary 
Social Security Benefit. 
If you are not married or have been n ^ r n ^ M »^ ?» * n <^ yr.u would be entitled to a straight life 
benefit for your lifetime only. 
To determine your annua! retirement benefit; 
(a) Take 1,75% of your Final Average Salary 
(b) Multiply (a) by your Credited Service, up to 35 years 
(c) Take 1.5% of your Primary Social Security Benefit 
(d) Multiply (c) by your Credited Service, up to33Vb years 
(e) Deduct (d) from (b) 
F ina l ly . . , 
(f) Multiply $174.00 (this is $14,50 a month) by your total period of Credited Service. 
The larger of (e) or (f) is your Company Pension at age 65, payable for your lifetime. 
•jl/hat if I leave tha Company before I re 45 re? 
If you leave the Company after becoming vested, that is, after you have completed at least 10 years of 
Eligibility Service, you are entitled to a monthly benefit starting at age 65. In addition, if you have com-
pleted at least 10 years of Continuous Service, you may elect to have your monthly payments begin as 
early as age 55 at a reduced amount. The reduction would be actuarially calculated for each month you 
are under age 65 when you start receiving benefits. 
If you have less than 10 years of Eligibility Service when you leave the Company, you will not receive any 
benefits from the Plan (unless you qualify for a normal retirement or disability retirement benefit). 
What if I become disabled? 
If you have at least one year of Continuous Service, become totally and permanently disabled and qualify 
for a Social Security disability benefit, you will be entitled to a benefit of 50% of your annual salary as of 
the date you became disabled, less 64% of your Primary Social Security Disability Benefit. Your dis-
ability benefit will commence six months after you have become totally and permanently disabled. 
If you are still disabled at age 65, your benefits thereafter will be no more than what you would have 
received if you had retired with a normal pension, computed as if you worked during the entire period of 
your disability. 
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You may also select a reduced benefit that, in the event of your death, will provide your spouse with a 
monthly income during her lifetime. 
What i f ! should die. . . 
After my benefit commences? 
If you receive a lifetime only benefit, no further payments would be made after your death. If you receive 
a joint and one-half survivor benefit, after your death, your surviving spouse would automatically get a 
benefit that is one-half of your retirement pension for the rest of your spouse's lifetime (or 100% of your 
retirement pension if you have retired at or after your normal retirement date having elected the 100% 
joint and survivor benefit or any other option elected prior to retirement as provided by the Plan). 
Before I retire? 
The Company provides basic benefit protection through the Group Insurance Plan. In addition, if you die 
after attaining age 50 but before age 65 and after completing at least 10 years of Continuous Service, 
your spouse will be entitled to a lifetime benefit under the Retirement Plan. Your spouse's benefit will 
be 70% of the benefit that would have been paid to you if you had retired early the day before your death, 
assuming you had elected a 100% option the day before you died. 
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DONNA S. TALLEY, 
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GLEN S. TALLEY, 
Defendant. 
CI vil Action No, 
MEMORANDUM •M 
This matter can a before the Court f^r hearing on the ilzh iay 
of August, 11? S: 4. Plaintiff va s present and represented rv attorney 
Paul Liapis. Defendant was p:-s^nt an 1 represented by Stanley *-
Smedley. The C O L : : n-uru the testimony of tha vitnesses sua ** e 
evidence profered by the parties and beirq fully sdv:--^1 -• , 
p r e m i s e s ma :es : t s i r?^: ; : lancum L/ecis ion a s : -, i 
. i d : 
lino: each nh.e n a r t i e s sn o u • r. 
n. . r r a s e d t o o : r. _ _ . -| : - 1 
1 . 3 . ' _ - ^ v 
1 . 
2 . 
divorce ire: 
upon entry. 
3. Th.it the Court 
the home at ehe time of -_he marriage was approximately equal to the 
amount r.- .;;->. subsequently contributed v>^ tre plaintiff and there-
fore that the parties have equal 
i decree of 
become final 
. e i e n d a n t h a d i n 
\ i ^  "* ^ CL r, -^r~ .^  
f- ,'•} ;-f r - - o -\ " *n .:i »~. -J > * •*- -, .ci t s awarded ro "he olaintiff free 
and clear of any claim cf the defendant and ~ .•>:• Court values the 
home at 3 6 o, -J 0') , 0 1. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded the vehicle in her possession and the 
Honda 90 ari toe Coure finds that they are wcrtn 34, 2~0,00 and $250,30 
respectively. 
6. ^aintiff is awarded the furniture and fixtures in the home 
with the exception of those items listed in Defendant's exhibit: 7, 
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Talley vs. Talley 
excluding therefrom the lawn mower and fertilizer spreader which 
is awarded to the plaintiff. The Court finds the items awarded 
to the plaintiff have a value of approximately $3,000.00 and those 
awarded to the defendant approximately $500.00. 
7. Each of rhe ponies are awarded their personal proper ty 
and possessions and defendant is awarded his sports equipment. 
8. That the piL:^~iff is awarded the food storage and freezer 
items and Cr-urr values them at approximately $600.00. 
9. Ctjvr -awards to the defendant the truck and Honda 250, 
having a value jf approximately $6,550.00 and $400.00 respectively. 
10. Defendant is to be awarded the 1978 Fiberform boat, to-
gether with accessories ^ni the Court finds that, the value thereof 
i s approximately $16
 f 6 0 C.0 C. 
11. That defendant, is awarded those items of furniture and 
miscellaneous proeprty listed in defendant's exhibit 7 with the 
exception of the lawn Viewer end the fertilizer spreader which is 
awarded to the p1a int iff. 
12. That the defendant is awarded the parties interest in the 
Portland Cement Profit Sharing valued at 327,196.00 -nd in the Lone 
Star stock, valued at $8,700.00. 
13. Each of the parties is awarded their IRA accounts. 
14. Defendant is awarded the penny stock worth approximately 
$1,236.00. 
15. Court finds that the retirement of the defendant is vested 
and that the actual value is difficult to determine because it is 
contingent upon the number of years that defendant would live follow-
ing retirement. For that reason Court values it at 515,0^0.00 and 
awards any interest therein to the defendant. 
16. The Coin t awards the silver to the defendant and values it 
at $3,000.00. 
1 7. That the defendant is awarded the ESOP stock and Court 
values it a t $690.00. 
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18. The Court awards to the plaintiff no interest in the 
defendant!s life insurance. 
19. As to the savings accounts of the parties Court finds 
that $2,000.00 of that amount consists of tax reserve and awardes 
the same to the defendant. The Court finds that approximately 
$4,000.00 was used to purchase the silver and that, silver now '.as 
a value of $3,000.00 which has h-on awarded to t-he nefendan:. The 
balance of $14,000.00 from cavils is awarded ?S,?50.03 t-> -he 
plaintiff and $5,250.00 to : he defendant which brings "he amount 
awarded to the parties as e.-u il as the C: ir: :~ ablir to 3:* witn 
the circumstances. 
20. Plaintiff Is ordered to assume and discharge the debt 
to Sears and to Allmans and any other debt which she has Incurred. 
since the date of separation and to hold defendant harmless thereon. 
21. That defendant Is ordered to assume and discharge any 
debt which he has incurred since the date of separation and to hold 
the plaintiff harmless thereon. 
22. Defendant is ordered to pay :o the plaintiff the su:? :f 
$250.00 per month as and for alimony f^ r a perloi ; f two
 :".
j
,r:. 
after which said alimony is reduced to the amount c: S17C. -0
 r r 
month, said alimony to terminate at tne end ,.f ~ai~; itve / a.* 
period or upon plaintiff's remarriage :u: "3 provide! :-y " w, wnich 
eve r occur s f ir s t. 
23. Each of the parties is awarded any sums in their respective 
checking accounts. 
24. Each of the parties is awarded the furniture ar/i fixtures 
that they brought into the marriage with the exception o: ohe sterns 
which have been given t :> the children previously. 
25. Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, for the use 
and benefit of her attorney, the sum of $1,500.00. 
26. Plaintiffs ittcraey Is ordered to draft the Findings and 
Decree and subin.it to ;ppcs ing counsel for approva 1 before for wa rdi ng 
to * ^ e Court for sign^ ^  —->. 
/ts 
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DATED-this 4th day of September, 19 84. 
? o 
RODNEY 
Distri cb-^oux t Judge 
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Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4101 
Telephone: 532-6996 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo—• 
DONNA S. TALLEY, 
p] a i nt I f f , 
v. 
GLEN S. TALLEY, 
Defendant. 
F I N D I N G S 0 F F A C T A N D 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 34379 
- - o o 0 o o - - • " • - - -
This matter having come on regular] y for trial on the 27th 
day of August, 1934, before the Honorable Rodney . rage, one of 
the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in 
person and by and through her attorney, Pai 1] H I i api s , ai id 
Defendant appearing in person and by and through his attorney/ 
Stanley M. Smedley f and the parties and other witnesses having 
b e e n d u ] y s "Vi :> r i i a n d e x a m i n e d u i 1 d e r o a 11 11 a i 1 d d o c i i m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e 
having been marked and received by the Court/ and more than three 
13) months having elapsed since the fili ng of plaintiff's 
Complaint, ai id the Cour t having heard the arguments of counsel 
for Plaintiff and Defendant and having inquired into the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence so adduced, and being fully advised 
in the premises, does now make, adopt and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was a bona fide and actual resident of Davis 
County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months immediately 
prior to the filing of the Complaint herein, 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having 
been married on June 14, 1968, in Bountiful, Utah, and having 
separated in December, 1983. 
3. Two children have been born as issue of this marriage, 
namely, Kelly, now age 22, and Teresa Ann, now age 27. 
4. On numerous occasions prior to the filing of 
Plaintiff's Complaint herein, Defendant treated Plaintiff 
cruelly, causing great mental distress and suffering, in that, 
among other things, Defendant has constantly threatened Plaintiff 
and the children with violence, has caused numerous arguments 
over small inconsequential matters, and has failed to meet the 
needs of the Plaintiff as a woman, wife and mother, all of which 
has destroyed the feelings of love and affection once held by 
Plaintiff for Defendant, causing this marriage to exist in name 
only. 
5. On numerous occasions prior to the filing of 
Plaintiff's Complaint herein, Plaintiff treated Defendant 
cruelly, causing great mental distress and suffering, in that, 
among other things, Plaintiff's child from a prior marriage has 
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caused inconvenience and annoyance to the Defendant, has refused 
to leave the home after he has attained his age of majority, and 
Plaintiff has put her children before the Defendant, all of which 
has destroyed the feelings of love and affection once held by 
Defendant for Plaintiff, causing this marriage to exist in name 
only. 
6. The Court finds from the testimony of Plaintiff and 
Defendant that the parties have been separated for a long time 
with no minor children, that all of the efforts at reconciliation 
have failed, that there is no good or useful purpose that would 
be served in prolonging this marriage, and that a Decree of 
Divorce should be entered and the same should become upon final 
signing and entry. 
7. The Court finds that the parties, during the course of 
their marriage, have acquired the following personal property: 
1971 Honda motorcycle $ 250.00 
1980 Thunderbird 4,200.00 
Furniture, furnishings, fixtures 
and appliances in the family home 
and lawn mower and fertilizer spreader 3,000.00 
Furniture items with the Defendant 
and/or hereby awarded to Defendant 
as per his Exhibit 7-D 500.00 
Freezer and food storage 600.00 
1982 Ford pickup and camper shell 6,550.00 
1975 Honda XL motorcycle 400.00 
1978 Fiberform boat, together with accessories 16,600.00 
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Defendantus interest in his Portland Cement 
profit sharing plan 
Defendant's interest in Lone Star stock 
First Interstate IRA (W) 
United Bank IRA (H) (three accounts) 
Penny stocks 
Defendant's retirement account 
500 ounces silver 
ESOP stock plan 
Utah Bank & Trust savings account 
Tracy Collins checking account (W) 
Utah Bank & Trust checking account (H) 
27,196.00 
8,700.00 
9,250.02 
7,114.58 
1,236.00 
15,000.00 
3,000.00 
690.00 
16,000.00 
250.00 
200.00 
8. The Court further finds that the Defendant prior to 
this marriage acquired a home located at 1163 South 350 West, 
Bountiful, Utah. The Court also finds that at the time Plaintiff 
moved into the home, she contributed from proceeds received from 
the sale of the home she owned prior to the marriage the sum of 
$6,600.00 and that each party, therefore, owns an equal interest 
in this home. The Court further finds the home to be valued at 
$65,000.00 by stipulation of the parties, with no mortgage or 
encumbrance against the property. 
9. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is presently 
employed by Flower Aviation with a net income of $922.28 per 
month. 
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10. -The Court finds from the testimony of Ashby S. Decker 
that the Defendant is presently employed by Lone Star Industries 
with a gross income through the 15th of Augustf 1984, of 
$28,478.00. 
11. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has present 
obligations outstanding to Sears in the sum of $66.00 and 
Allman's Carpets in the sum of $66.00. The Court finds that the 
Defendant has indicated no outstanding debts and obligations. 
12. The Court finds that Plaintiff has incurred attorney's 
fees in connection with this matter. 
13. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has no interest in 
the Defendant's life insurance policies. 
14. With regard to the Defendant's retirement account, the 
Court finds that said account is vested and that the actual value 
is difficult to determine because it is contingent upon the 
number of years that the Defendant would live on retirement. The 
Court further finds that the Plaintiff's actuarial expert, Ronald 
N. Roy, has placed a value of said retirement account at 
$30,040.93. The Court finds the reasonable value of said account 
to be $15,000.00. 
15. Specifically with regard to the $20,000.00 savings 
account held by the parties with Tracy Collins Bank, the Court 
finds that $2,000.00 of said amount consists of tax reserves 
maintained by the Defendant. The Court further finds that 
approximately $4,000.00 of said account was used to purchase the 
5 
500 ounces of silver, which the Court has valued above at 
$3,000.00. 
16. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is in need of 
additional support from the Defendant for a period of five (5) 
years. 
17. The Court finds that each of the parties should be 
awarded the furniture and fixtures which they brought into the 
marriage, with the exception of those items which were given to 
the children previously. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
adopts its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from each other upon the grounds of mental cruelty, with 
said Decree to become final upon signing and entry. 
3. The home of the parties located at 1163 South 350 West 
Bountiful, Utah, is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff, DONNA S. 
TALLEY, as her sole and separate property, free and clear of any 
interest of the Defendant. 
4. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of 
$250.00 per month as alimony for a period of two (2) years, after 
which, said alimony is to be reduced to the sum of $150.00 per 
month for a period of three (3) additional years, with said 
alimony then to cease at the termination of the five-year period 
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or upon Plaintiff's remarriage or as provided by law, whichever 
occurs first. 
6. Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate property 
the 1982 Ford pickup truck and camper shell, the 1975 Honda XL 
motorcycle, his Utah Bank & Trust checking account, the $7,250.00 
from the parties' Utah Bank & Trust savings account (which 
includes the $2,000.00 awarded Defendant for tax reserves), the 
1978 Fiberform boat with accessories, his IRA accounts, the 500 
ounces of silver, the Defendant's ESOP plan, the Defendant's 
Portland Cement profit sharing plan, Defendant's retirement 
account, Defendant's Merrill Lynch Lone Star stock plan, the 
furniture in Defendant's possession defined as bedroom set, gun 
cabinet, 300 Savage rifle, 12-gauge shotgun, 22 Browning rifle, 
22 Colt revolver, X-70 camera, G.E. tape recorder, binoculars, 
Honda 500 watt generator, McCullough chain saw, battery charger, 
3/8 inch hand drill, 1/2 inch hand drill, vibrating sander, 2 
coleman stoves, 2 coolers (red and blue), suitcase, Toro 7-24 
snow blower, car stands, new RCA television, couch which makes 
into a bed, globe on stand, his sports equipment, the penny 
stocks with Tintic Mining, Classic Mining, Modern Minerals, 
Midnight Gold and Silver, Gyro, Stansbury and Airlift 
International, and his personal effects and belongings. 
7. Plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate property 
the 1980 Thunderbird, the 1971 Honda 90 motorcycle, all the 
remaining furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances, 
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including -the lawn mower and fertilizer spreader, the freezer and 
food storage, her Tracy Collins checking account, her First 
Interstate IRA account, $8,750.00 of the parties1 Utah Bank & 
Trust savings account, and her personal effects and belongings. 
8. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay and hold the 
Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations: The 
accounts with Sears and Allman's Carpets. 
9. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay and hold the 
Plaintiff harmless from any debts or obligations incurred by him 
since the date of separation up to the present time. 
10. The Defendant is hereby awarded all interest he holds 
in his life insurance policies to do with as he chooses. 
14. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant in 
the sum of $1,500,00 for attorneyfs fees in this matter. 
15. The parties are each awarded the items of furniture and 
fixtures which they brought into the marriage, with the exception 
of those items which have been given away by the parties to their 
children, and that position is ratified by the Court. 
16. The parties are ordered to execute any and all 
documents necessary to carry forth the intent of this order. 
DATED this /4ft*day of 6e4ober, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
J l AH 
)r DAVIS )SS 
NDERSIGNED, CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
F DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH DO HEREBY 
HAT THc ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS 
to FULL COPY OP. AN ORIGINAL DOCU-
-ILE \N M v OcF:CE A3 SUCH CLERK. 
:SS MY H, ,ND SE/.L OF SAID OFFICE _ 
/ A E L G. A L ^ f P . I N , CLEItRK 
APPFOVED AS TO FORM: 
m 
STANLEY My^SMEDLE^—~ 
Attorney/jor Defendant 
/ / 
y 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to Stanley M. Smedley, Esq., Layton Professional 
Center, 190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2, Layton, Utah 84041, this 
s *~ day of October, 1984. 
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GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS ^"Ljj^Or CJ'L'.vT '"*' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff "* 
Third Floor, New York Building — 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 532-6996 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OoOoo 
DONNA S. TALLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GLEN S. TALLEY, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 34879 
ooOoo 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 27th 
day of August, 1984, before the Honorable Rodney S. Page, one of 
the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in 
person and by and through her attorney, Paul H. Liapis, and 
Defendant appearing in person and by and through his attorney, 
Stanley M. Smedley, and the parties and other witnesses having 
been duly sworn and examined under oath, and documentary evidence 
having been marked and received by the Court, and more than three 
(3) months having elapsed since the filing of Plaintiff's 
Complaint, and the Court having heard the arguments of counsel 
for Plaintiff and Defendant and having inquired into the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence so incurred and being fully advised 
in the premises, and the Court having made and entered herein its 
written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf and upon motion 
of Paul H. Liapis of GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS, attorneys 
for Plaintiff: 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant be and they are each hereby 
awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other upon the grounds of 
mental cruelty, and the marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant 
be and the same is hereby dissolved, and the parties are hereby 
free and absolutely released from the bonds of matrimony and all 
the obligations thereof, with said Decree to become final upon 
signing and entry. 
2. The home of the parties located at 1163 South 350 West, 
Bountiful, Utah, be and the same is hereby awarded to the 
Plaintiff, DONNA S. TALLEY, as her sole and separate property, 
free and clear of any interest of the Defendant. 
3. Defendant be and is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiff 
the sum of $250.00 per month as alimony for a period of two (2) 
years, after which, said alimony is to be reduced to the sum of 
$150.00 per month for a period of three (3) additional years, 
with said alimony then to cease at the termination of the 
five-year period or upon Plaintiff's remarriage or as provided by 
law, whichever occurs first. 
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4* Defendant be and is hereby awarded as his sole and 
separate property the 1982 Ford pickup truck and camper shell, 
the 1975 Honda XL motorcycle, his Utah Bank & Trust checking 
account, the $7,250.00 from the parties' Utah Bank & Trust 
savings account (which includes the $2,000.00 awarded Defendant 
for tax reserves), the 1978 Fiberform boat with accessories, his 
JRA accounts, the 500 ounces of silver, the Defendant's ESOP 
plan, the Defendant's Portland Cement profit sharing plan, 
Defendant's retirement account, Defendant's Merrill Lynch Lone 
Star stock plan, the furniture in Defendant's possession defined 
as bedroom set, gun cabinet, 300 Savage rifle, 12-gauge shotgun, 
22 Browning rifle, 22 Colt revolver, X-70 camera, G.E. tape 
recorder, binoculars, Honda 500 watt generator, McCullough chain 
saw, battery charger, 3/8 inch hand drill, 1/2 inch hand drill, 
vibrating sander, 2 coleman stoves, 2 coolers (red and blue), 
suitcase, Toro 7-24 snow blower, car stands, new RCA television, 
couch which makes into a bed, globe on stand, his sports 
equipment, the penny stocks with Tintic Mining, Classic Mining, 
Modern Minerals, Midnight Gold and Silver, Gyro, Stansbury and 
Airlift International, and his personal effects and belongings. 
5. Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded as her sole and 
separate property the 1980 Thunderbird, the 1971 Honda 90 
motorcycle, all the remaining furniture, furnishings, fixtures 
and appliances, including the lawn mower and fertilizer spreader, 
the freezer and food storagef her Tracy Collins checking account, 
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her First-Interstate IRA account, $8,750.00 of the parties' Utah 
Bank & Trust savings account, and her personal effects and 
belongings'. 
6. Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to assume and hold 
Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations: The 
accounts with Sears and Allman's Carpets. 
7. Defendant be and is hereby ordered to assume and hold 
Plaintiff harmless from any debts or obligations incurred by him 
since the date of separation up to the present time. 
8. Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded judgment against the 
Defendant in the the sum of $1,500.00 as attorney's fees. 
9. Defendant be and is hereby awarded all interest he 
holds in his life insurance policies to do with as he chooses. 
10. The parties be and they are each hereby awarded the 
items of furniture and fixtures which they brought into the 
marriage, with the exception of those items which have been given 
away by the parties to their children, and that position is 
ratified by the Court. 
11. The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do 
and perform all the matters and things required by each of them 
to be done herein. 
DATED this JH^day of Oe^ ofeer, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
JJ2 
RODNEY SL^AGE ^~* 
D i s t r i c t uourt Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
^ 
STANLEY M. SMBDLEY ^—^~~~ 
Attorney for/Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Stanley M. Smedley, Esq., Layton Professional Center, 190 South 
Fort Lane, Suite 2, Layton, Utah 84041, this J2£L day of 
October, 1984. 
STATE OF UTAH
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COO*! OFU*«S W M E < S D A H O r g ^ ° D O C U . 
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